Kinmen and the law that says no
My op-ed — “Kinmen and the law that says no” — runs in Taiwan’s leading English-language daily, the Taipei Times.
China’s use of the issue
Beijing is methodically integrating Kinmen’s infrastructure into its “peaceful reunification” strategy. Since 2018, 90 percent of the archipelago’s water already comes from Fujian. China now proposes electricity, gas, and bridges — while having designated Fujian a “demonstration zone for integrated cross-strait development.” Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council characterizes the approach as “united front” work: normalizing dependency until separation becomes economically unbearable. The Philippine precedent — where State Grid Corp of China has held 40 percent of the national operator since 2008 — illustrates what ceding control of critical infrastructure to a state that claims your territory actually means.
Kinmen’s interests
Kinmen is not Taiwan. The archipelago escaped Japanese colonization, lived under military administration until 1992, and endured the 1958 bombardments. Two generations knew the garrison as their only employer, school, and government. Today, electricity on the islands is expensive and supply is constrained: a connection to Fujian, just five kilometers away, would save NT$3 billion a year. Locally, this is not a geopolitical abstraction — it is a bill.
Taiwan’s reason for refusal
Taiwan’s legal framework explicitly prohibits this type of infrastructure-sharing with China; changing the law would require a vote in the Legislative Yuan. But the refusal goes beyond law: an interconnected electricity grid is critical infrastructure controllable remotely, impossible to stockpile or diversify like a cargo shipment. Refusing costs roughly NT$3 billion a year — a price Taiwan should bear visibly, by accelerating renewables on the island. Kinmen endured decades of bombardment so others would not have to; the least the nation can do is fund its energy transition.